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A-6 E Medium Range Bomber Aircraft
CAP Combat Air Patrol
CBG Carrier Battle Group
CBGC Carrier Battle Group Commander
EMCON.... Emissions Control (Electronic)
E-2C Long Range Early Warning Aircraft
F-14 Long Range Fighter Aircraft
F/A-18 Short Range Fighter and Attack Aircraft
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RECON... .Reconnaissance
RESA Research, Evaluation, and System Analysis
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1. The Need For Alternatives
With decreasing budgets, a fact of life for the military, new or
untried methods of test and evaluation must be employed to avoid the
tremendous outlay of capital to develop new command, control, and
communications capabilities. The best time to test is while the upgrade or
concept is in the Concept Development Phase of the acquisition process. This
means that decisions could be made prior to research and development money
being spent. In the case of communication development, a known set of
information inputs could be synthesized from a basic concept using
wargaming to evaluate the communications inflow to an operational force. In
this case a Carrier Battle Group (CBG) was chosen. Three main questions
will be addressed in this study:
1. Can a wargame simulation provide the mechanism for an accurate
evaluation of communications input to a carrier battle group?
2. Can a wargame provide a generic method for acquisition planners to
simulate the value of communications information in an anti-air
warfare environment?
3. Will a statistical analysis of an event driven simulation provide a basis for
the use of wargames to test proposed communications upgrades ?
2. Model Alternatives
a. Warfare Styles
The four styles of warfare included for discussion are tactical,
operational, regional and strategic. Each will be briefly outlined. The tactical
style of warfare includes small scale insertion or strike into cooperative or
uncooperative nations, illustrated by the invasion of Grenada in 1985 by the
United States. The number of personnel involved is approximately 5000 land
troops or less. Sea power involved would consist of a carrier battle group or
less.
The second style of warfare is the operation scale, best
represented by Desert Storm in 1991. The size of the battle is limited to a
single enemy with moderate to large scale fighting abilities. This aggression
is met with a single or coalition force. The number of personnel involved will
extend to approximately four divisions or more on each side. The operational
scale of warfare is the level currently assessed by the government of the
United States to be the largest scale of warfare in which we, as a nation, will
engage.
The third style of warfare is a regional conflict, involving a
geographic area which includes several countries. Two coalition forces
comprised of several of our allies engage in large scale warfare. An example of
this style would be if Ukraine and Russia came to the "aid" of Lithuania in
conflict with Poland. On the Polish side, the United States and Great Britain
could come to Poland's "aid". This warfare is not quite global; however, it
involves a large continental style of warfare.
The last style of warfare to be discussed is the strategic level,
characterized by a global conflict similar to WWII. The military engagements
in this scenario include a variety of large and small scale battles that occur in
several geographic locations and environments. This scale of warfare can also
include thermonuclear exchange.
The decision on wrhich wargame to use is based on what level
of warfare is considered for analysis. In a strategic conflict too many variables
need to be analyzed in order to evaluate communication upgrades for
reasonable results to be established. In either tactical, operational or regional
conflicts the scale of warfare is such that accurate information can be
postulated by examining a limited conflict.
b. Types of Simulations
(1) Systemic. Determining the effect of increased information
resolution to a CBG could be done via twro methods. The first is by use of a
systemic simulation. A systemic simulation is one in which people are not
involved in decision-making during the running of the simulation. All
decisions in the game are made by a series of algorithms written into the
program prior to the simulation run. A database of weapons, capabilities, and
associated information is stored for use by the simulation. Once this
information is loaded into the program, the computer will run the simulation
to the time or the event scheduled for simulation conclusion. By varying the
inputs a pattern of results may develop over a series of runs.
(2) Man in the Loop. A man-in-the-loop wargame is one
whereby a person or group of people interact with decision inputs during
execution of the wargame. The inputs to the wargame are at various levels.
Both sides of a conflict may have human control or one side can be fully
automated. Automated responses can be added to both sides to minimize the
amount of inputs required to run the wargame. To a new wargame
commander the idiosyncrasies of game operation may cause the person to
ignore significant events while trying to input commands to the wargame. In
order to keep the wargame a test of strategy, certain assumed actions may be
automated to reduce inputs.
c. Model Selection
A choice must be made between having personal biases
inputted to a wargame or to have algorithms make all decisions during the
simulation. The contrasting approaches must be examined for each
application. The algorithms in a simulation take decisions and reduce them to
mathematical or logical expressions. In the case of simulating a ship's
transit across the Atlantic a simulation might best be suited. Several actions
can be expressed by algorithms. A few examples of repetitive actions would
be:
-The probability of mechanical failure occurring during a lapse of time or the
distance traveled.
-The average speed of advance expected due to certain mechanical failures.
This would include repair times.
The effect on the speed of advance by sea state or weather.
These are a few of the inputs that this example could operate within.
All these actions could be simulated by a probability of occurrence and
predetermined reaction times. If the system to be evaluated is repetitive or
predictable in nature and the actions are truly random, then a simulation
would be the desired choice. By running the simulation several times the
results of each run can be examined, and trends can be arrived at by
statistical computation.
When discussing a wargame the main perception to keep in mind
is that there is some control given to human operator(s). This control can
vary in intensity with each wargame. The idea behind a wargame is that the
tactics of the commander are tested. The commander has enough control to
change the outcome of a battle. Certain commands that are repetitive or
unchanging can be automated to relieve the commander of needless command
inputs. An example of this situation is the use of a Standard Missile 2
defensive surface-to-air missile. This missile is used to engage mcoming
enemy aircraft or cruise missiles. As long as a contact is labeled hostile, a
missile will be fired at its optimum range. As long as contact classification is
correct this defensive action can be automatic.
The Carrier Battle Group Commander (CBGC) has absolute
control of all offensive action taken by the CBG. However the CBGC can
designate person(s) to handle the defensive actions of a CBG. These
commanders handle several areas such as anti-air warfare, anti-surface
warfare, and antisubmarine warfare. This list is not complete but covers
some major areas of responsibility. When dealing with the defense of an
aircraft carrier, plans can change within an instant. This high pressure
environment, along with little response time, requires a level thinker and
command presence. These decisions can be based on fact and experience. A
fact is something that can be programmed with algorithms; however
experience has little to do with algorithms. Significant battles throughout
history have shown that unorthodox tactics and leadership abilities have been
a successful combination. Taking this information into account, a
man-in-the-loop wargame was selected.
II. PROBLEM DEFINITION AND MODEL
DEVELOPMENT
A. PROBLEM DEFINITION
The primary problem to be investigated is to ascertain how various
information packages affect the Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) mission of the CBG.
For carrier battle group operations, valid and usable information input is
essential to enable the CBGC (Blue Forces) to make decisions. Decisions for
the defense of the battle group are directly related to the type and content of
information received by the CBGC.
The amount and quality of information directly affect the assets that the
CBGC assigns to defense, as well as organic (battle group) information
collection. Without information the CBGC uses most of its assets in the
search for threats that may exist. The impact of this information input is
the intent of this study.
The information inputs to the CBG (Carrier Battle Group) have two
sources: inorganic and organic. Inorganic sources are information that is
provided to the CBG from origins outside the carrier battle group. Such
information as high altitude imagery, information gathered by national
assets, and local area sources are all transmitted to the carrier battle group.
Organic sources are information inputs from forces controlled by the CBGC.
Several origins of information are available to the CBG:
Radar contacts
ESM (Electronic Support Measures) contacts
Visually identified contacts
Voice radio transmissions
Radar contacts can be received from shipboard sources or airborne assets that
have used their own radar unit to locate ships and aircraft. ESM contacts are
an interception of electronic emissions of ships and aircraft. These emissions
are usually radar in origin and can be intercepted passively (without the
source of the emission becoming aware of detection). Visually identified
contacts can be from aircraft or shipborne lookouts. Finally, interceptions of
radio message traffic can indicate ships or aircraft in the area.
In this study a single aspect of carrier battle group operations was
selected. By focusing on one area of operation in the battle group an analysis
can be made of the impact of information regarding CBG defense. The aspect
of operations that this study analyzes is the anti-air warfare (AAW) portion of
carrier defense. When any engagement is evaluated the primary measure of
effectiveness is who survived and their operational status. Chapter IV
describes the analysis methodology.
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B. DEFINITION OF PARAMETERS
1. Blue Forces
When dealing with the air defense of a CBG the main weapons of
choice are standoff weapons. Standoff weapons allow the CBG to eliminate
any threat before the hostile force has the ability to fire their weapons at the
battle group. The primary standoff weapons for the CBG are aircraft. When
a CBG is approaching a possible hostile area the CBGC will deploy an initial
package of assorted aircraft to put a protective sphere of influence around the
carrier. A protective sphere of influence describes an area of airspace and
ocean around the carrier that is controlled by the CBG. This allows the battle
group to know the location of all ships and aircraft within this sphere. By
controlling this sphere no hostile influences are allowed to endanger the CBG.
The number and type of each aircraft launched, as well as their
location from the carrier, is unique to each CBGC. A broad template will be
outlined for a probable makeup of forces. Package One will usually include
two to five Combat Air Patrols (CAPs). Each CAP consists of two to three
fighter aircraft. These aircraft could be F-14 Tomcats or F/A-18 Hornets.
The aircraft would be armed with air-to-air missiles so that any hostile
aircraft can be engaged. Due to their high performance, fighters cannot
sustain extended flight times without refueling. Additional support aircraft
designated for aerial refueling will be dispatched with the CAPs to allow the
fighters to remain airborne longer than one hour. The refueling aircraft could
be the A-6E Intruder bomber or the S-3B Viking antisubmarine aircraft,
both having the same refueling stores attached. The final piece of Package
One will be the launch of one to three E-2C Hawkeye early warning aircraft.
These aircraft possess no armaments but are equipped with long range radar
to extend the radar horizon of the CBG. With both air-to-air and surface
search radars their effective line of sight is approximately 200 nautical miles
(NM).
The next phase of operations is detection. Detection is the
identification of known or unknown platforms that are operating within the
carrier's sphere of influence or possess some potential threat to the CBG.
Once a platform has been identified as unknown or hostile, a reaction to
detection or Package Two will most likely be dispatched to intercept and
positively identify the platform. The aircraft dispatched are usually fighter
aircraft previously launched as CAPs. If unknown air platforms are
positively identified as hostile through the Intercept/Fire and permission to
fire is given, the fighter aircraft dispatched will target and fire on these
hostiles with air-to-air missiles.
The engagement will result in a possible action with a possible launch
of Package Three . If the hostile aircraft have been destroyed then no further
action is needed. However, if the hostile aircraft are not destroyed then
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Package Three, consisting of more CAP aircraft, may need to be dispatched to
further prosecute the hostile(s).
2. Orange Forces
The enemy (Orange Forces ) forces have a different agenda than the
blue forces, i.e., firing their weapons at optimum range at the CBG. From
the enemy's perspective their job is to locate the CBG and launch their cruise
missiles, thus disabling the mission capability of the battle group. The first
package launched is the Maneuver/Search assets to locate the carrier and her
escorts. A variety of search aircraft are available from enemy sources; these
and other enemy aircraft choices will be discussed in Chapter III.
The Manuver/Search phase will be followed by a detection of other
forces. The Maneuver/Search package will be followed by a Reaction Package
Two consisting of long range bombers or attack aircraft, These aircraft will
attempt to maneuver close enough to the carrier group to fire their weapons
at optimum range. The Manuver/Fire segment will occur prior to weapons
launch. An additional objective of Orange Forces is to remain covert as long
as possible in order to reduce their losses prior to weapons launch. A balance
between remaining covert and engaging the battle group quickly is a difficult
feat to accomplish.
The final aspect of the strike is the Result Phase , determining
whether or not the weapons are able to be launched and the outcome of their
11
firing. If sufficient damage is sustained by the battle group to reduce the
threat of the enemy then no further action is necessary. If, however, the
carrier group still poses a threat then a Reaction strike may be launched to
complete the mission.
C. MODEL ALTERNATIVES
At the Naval Postgraduate School warlab, two main wargames are
available. These are the Joint Theater Level Simulation (JTLS) and the
Research, Evaluation, and Systems Analysis (RESA). Both models allow
human interaction with the game. There are significant differences between
these simulations that need to be discussed in order to arrive at a correct
choice.
1. Joint Level Theater Level Simulation (JTLS)
JTLS is a computer-assisted simulation that models two-sided air, ground,
and naval combat with logistical and intelligence support. It is designed as
a theater-level model for use in the following areas:
1. The analysis, development, and evaluation of contingency plans and
joint tactics.
2. The evaluation of alternative military strategies.
3. The analysis of combat systems.
The first JTLS model became operational in September, 1983. Now in its
ninth release (Version 1.65C), JTLS is owned by the Force Structure,
Resource, and Assessment Directorate (J-8) of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
.
[Ref. 1: p. 9]
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This system was designed for the joint style of engagements and does
contain a naval module. This module only portrays the U.S. Navy as
operating off the coast of an enemy. The Navy, until recently, has usually
operated in an open ocean or "blue water" environment. This type of naval
engagement does not model well the desired war-at-sea engagement.
Although the Anti-Air Warfare Commander will require some training for any
wargame, JTLS requires a three to four week training evolution to become
familiar with the most basic command sequencing. All of these factors led to
a decision not to use JTLS.
2. Research, Evaluation, and System Analysis (RESA)
The Research, Evaluation and Systems Analysis (RESA) Facility provides
a computer-based simulation of the naval warfare environment that is
capable of supporting a wide variety of research and development efforts
as well as training for senior officers. The design of the RESA simulator
has focused on the command and control of naval battle group/
force operations, with developments in progress to provide a simulation of
the joint warfare environment. The range of the operations that can
be simulated with RESA extends from theater-level operations through
single platform operations. The system is designed for interactive control
of simulated forces, with man-in-the-loop command decisions forming
a part of the simulation; however, capabilities exist to script a scenario and
to replay it numerous times for statistical analysis. A capability
also exists to generate realistic, scenario-driven data streams in various
formats to simulate fleet or prototype command and control data processors
to support shipboard training, system testing, interoperability assessment,
or similar applications. The simulator may be operated as a distributed
system, with interactive participants at various sites. [Ref. 2: p. 1]
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3. Selecting The Model
The RESA wargame was chosen for several reasons:
1. The game is designed for a naval engagement similar to that selected
for this thesis.
2. RESA satisfies the operational level of warfare described in the Problem
Definition.
3. A scripted naval scenario needed for this thesis was easier to accomplish
than with the JTLS simulation.
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III. RESAWARGAME AND SCENARIO DESCRIPTION
A. BACKGROUND
1. RESA Wargame
The Research, Evaluation, and Systems Analysis (RESA) wargame
provides the range of operations necessary for this study. The RESA
wargame is a computer-based simulation of a naval environment for training
and for research and development requirements.
2. Personnel Requirements
The wargame as designed for this study employed the use of aviation
unrestricted line officers to play the Carrier Battle Group Commander's
designated anti-air warfare commander (AAWC) for defense. The primary
choices were resident senior officers that are instructors at the Naval
Postgraduate School and junior aviation officers that are students as
alternates. The operators of the wargame were warlab technicians that input
the AAWC orders into the wargame. This process gives the wargame as near
real time reaction as possible. Without the use of the trained technician,
hours of instruction to the AAWC would be necessary to realize the required




There were three different scenarios that each commander played.
Each engagement lasted approximately 50-60 minutes of real time which
equated to 110-120 minutes of game time. The Blue and Orange forces
involved remained the same for each scenario; however the geographic
locations and information resolution varied for each scenario.
In order to observe the results of the wargame in detail, a decision was
made early to observe only one aspect of the defense of a carrier battle group.
The AAW environment allows a fast paced and realistic test of a AAWC. A
proposal to integrate the battle group warfare departments will be explored in
the conclusions and recommendations chapter of this study. By restricting the
scope of the wargame, an impact analysis of communications input to a CBG
was evaluated. The Blue forces consisted of a carrier battle group with seven
support ships (see Table 1). The Orange forces had three generic bases with
varying airborne strike weapons (see Table 2). All aircraft weapons and
ranges for this wargame are listed in Table 3 for the Blue forces and Table 4
for the Orange forces, respectively. The characteristics of all weapon
parameters are derived from UNCLASSIFIED sources. The sources used
were the Jane's series of handbooks on warfare equipment.
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TABLE 1 (BLUE FORCES)












































































The first assumption to be made is that the Orange forces striking the
carrier battle group have perfect knowledge. The intent of this study is to
examine the decisions made by the AAWC. These decisions are based on
information gained from message traffic delivered to the AAWC. Under no
circumstances does the Orange force foreknowledge of the CBG location affect
the message traffic incoming to the AAWC. If Blue forces were made aware
of Orange force perfect knowledge, then EMCON and avoidance of enemy
targeting would be pointless. This information was withheld from the AAWCs
to allow as much realism in their reactions as possible. This first assumption
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TABLE 2 (ORANGE FORCES)
15 Backfire 45 AS-6 10Mig-31 30AA-9
Bomber Cruise Missile Interceptor Air-to-Air
BASEl
Missile
2 Bear-D 3 IL-78 2 IL-76 20AA-11
Surface Tanker Air Air-to-Air
Reconnaissance Reconnaissance Missile
15 Backfire 45 AS-6 10Mig-31 30AA-9
BASE 2 Bomber Cruise Missile Interceptor Air-to-Air
Missile
2 Bear-D 3 IL-78 2 IL-76 20AA-11
Surface Tanker Air Air-to-Air
Reconnaissance Reconnai ssanc e Missile
15 Backfire 45 AS-6 15 Fulcrum 30AA-10
Bomber Cruise Missile Fighter Air-to Air
BASE 3
Missile
2 Bear-D 3 IL-78 30AA-11
Surface Tanker Air-to-Air
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TABLE 3 BLUE FORCE WEAPONRY
WEAPON NATO NAME TYPE RANGE (NM)
Sea Sparrow SAME Surface-to-Air
Missile
7
SM-1MR Standard Surface-to-Air 50
Missile 1 Missile










Air-to-Air SAME Air-to-Air 40
Missile Missile
Sidewinder SAME Air-to-Air 9
Missile
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TABLE 4 ORANGE FORCE WEAPONRY
WEAPON NATO NAME TYPE RANGE (KM)
AA-9 Acrid Air-to-Air 70
AA-10 Alamo Air-to-Air 35
AA-11 AtoU Air-to-Air 8
AM-39 Exocet Cruise Missile 50
AS-3 Kangaroo Cruise Missile 650
AS-4 Kitchen Cruise Missile 400
AS-6 Kitchen Cruise Missile 400
reduces the game time by eliminating the need for Orange forces to search for
the Abraham Lincoln and her escorts.
The second assumption is that search aircraft from both sides are
launched as the game begins. For the Orange forces one IL-76 May Air
reconnaissance aircraft is launched as well as one Bear-D surface
reconnaissance aircraft. The Blue forces have one Combat Air Patrol (CAP)
consisting of two F/A-18 Hornets with a weapons loadout of four Sparrow
air-to-air missiles and two Sidewinder air-to-air missiles (see Table 3 for
ranges). This CAP is located at a range of 200 Nautical Miles (NM) from the
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carrier along the CBG intended track. In addition, two E-2C Hawkeye early
warning aircraft a located at a range of 200 NM from the carrier at thirty
degrees either side of the carrier's intended track. A KA - 6D airborne tanker
is collocated with the E-2C. All aircraft launched have 100% fuel onboard
when their stations are reached to simulate refueling having taken place.
The third assumption is that the CBG is located approximately 835
NM from the closest hostile base. This reduces the amount of flying time
necessary for enemy aircraft and thus reduces the playing time required.
The fourth assumption is that all enemy and friendly base forces are
constant in all three scenarios. This assumption maintains a level of
consistency for the AAWC and reduces the briefing time for the warfare
commanders prior to each game. However, the tactics are different for each
strike. Each of the scenarios will be described briefly below to allow the
reader to judge the intensity of each conflict.
The fifth assumption is that each Orange force bomber carries only one
air-to-surface missile. This allows a wider threat axis from Orange forces
without overwhelming the AAWC. In addition this assumption allows a
missile firing to also represent a hostile aircraft penetrating the CBG defense
net.
22
The last assumption made was that each player played the same
sequence of scenarios. The order of scenarios played are Scenarios One, Two,
and Three.
3. Message Traffic
In each of the scenarios the AAWC received two messages per game
played. The timing of the delivery of these messages was the same in each
game due to the fact that Orange forces did the same thing in each game.
This allowed the impact of the message traffic to be evaluated uniformly from
player to player. A random number generator helped to decide the first two
and the last player's information resolution. The message traffic had three
levels of resolution: Low, Medium, and High. Each level of information had
an equal chance of being picked for the first player. Once chosen, the two
remaining resolutions had an equal chance of being picked for the second
player. Once this level was chosen for the second player the remaining
resolution level went to the third player. The fourth player had an equal
chance of receiving any of the three levels of resolution. This process was
repeated for each of the three scenarios. A description of the message
contents is listed in Appendix A.
4. Scenario Overview
Although each scenario has the same resources with which to engage,
the Orange forces did not use all forty -five Backfire bombers in each game.
Scenario One served as a learning experience for each player so the player
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could understand the method of play. Therefore, Scenario One only used
two flights of five and two flights of three Backfires for the assault. The
threat axis for the carrier was approximately one hundred fifty degrees. This
was enough firepower to test the commander but not sufficient to overwhelm
tne dog m tne nrst game.
Scenario Two was progressively more difficult. Five flights of five
bombers were used to assault the carrier battle group. These five flights
used a threat axis against the carrier of approximately two hundred fifty
degrees.
Scenario Three was the most difficult of the three scenarios. Seven
flights of five bombers were used for the Orange force attack. The threat axis
was approximately three hundred thirty degrees against the Blue forces.
5. Scenario One
Due to the downsizing of Iraqi forces as a result of Operation Desert
Storm, Iran has emerged from the conflict as the regional power in Southwest
Asia. A massive arms procurement program has made Iran's defenses
formidable. In a recent clash with Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC) on oil pricing, Iran has declared the Straits of Hormuz as
being the territorial waters of Iran. This declaration includes all air space
over the straits.
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The mission of the Abraham Lincoln Carrier Battle Group is to insert
the battle group through the Straits of Hormuz into the Persian Gulf and
reestablish the international waterway and airway as quickly as possible.
Iran has threatened to sink any ship coming in or out of the Persian Gulf.
Recent aircraft patrols indicate that Iran plans to stand behind their
blockade. The battlegroup is to expect heavy airborne resistance. Additional
intelligence surmises that Iranian overflights of local neighbors may be
possible due to the corrosive stance of Iran. An air strike of three flights of
five Backfire bombers will engage the CBG.
6. Scenario Two
During a recent reunification summit between China and Taiwan an
argument over local forms of government has resulted in an international
incident. China has decided to retake Taiwan by force. China now occupies
southern Taiwan with an operational air base. In addition, China has taken
this opportunity to seize Batan Island. China has anticipated the world's
condemnation and has threatened any ship of war or aircraft operating in the
South China Sea. Trie Lincoln battle group is to steam into the South China
Sea and establish the first international presence. China's reaction to this
provocation can not be estimated at this time. If engaged, the commander of
the Lincoln battle group is to engage and defend the group with vigor. The
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key word is to defend. Under no circumstances is the battlegroup to engage in
land strike warfare without permission from higher authority.
7. Scenario Three
After the fall of the Soviet Union a group called the New Soviets has
taken over in western Russia. In taking power, the New Soviets have
nullified a recent agreement to return the Kuril Islands to Japan. The
Japanese have repopulated the islands only to find New Soviet troops
invading their newly acquired territory. After some resistance, civilian
casualties were heavy. The New Soviets classify the Kuril Islands as their
territory and are prepared to back their claim. The Lincoln battle group is to
test the resolve of the New Soviets and sail into the area. Although more of
the fleet is steaming to the area, the Lincoln battle group will be the first on
scene. Airborne attack is likely, however a reminder is that the battlegroup
will defend itself only if attacked. This is to give the National Command
Authority time to make a decision whether to engage in a regional conflict.
8. Rules of Engagement
Patrols of Anti-Surface Warfare (ASUW) aircraft can be expected in
all scenarios. Any overt runs of these aircraft at the CBG will be warned by
radio communications. This is limited to offensive platforms. If no response
is given by offensive aircraft the flight may be engaged. Any hostile aircraft
within weapons range will be engaged. Any surveillance aircraft may be
engaged if the platform penetrates within 150 nm of the CBG. If possible,
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any known hostile aircraft will be engaged prior to hostile reaching maximum
weapons range. Engagement range will be determined by the Battle Group
Commander's assessment and resources available. A listing of the briefings




Recall that the questions posed for the thesis were stated in Chapter I as
follows:
- Can a wargame simulation provide the mechanism for an accurate
evaluation of communications input to a carrier battle group?
- Can a wargame provide a generic method for acquisition planners to
simulate the value of communications information in an anti-air warfare
environment?
- Will a statistical analysis of an event driven simulation provide a basis for
the use of wargames to test proposed communications upgrades ?
B. PARAMETERS
The RESA wargame scenarios have been developed, however a review of
the parameters will be used for a discussion of the Measures of Effectiveness
in the following section. The evolution of this wargame consisted of two
dependent timelines being followed. The first timeline was followed by the
Blue forces and the second by the Orange forces. These timelines are shown
















Figure 2 Orange Force Timeline
These timelines are generic in nature, and a detailed analysis of the Blue
force reactions will be examined in Chapter V. In the case of the Orange
forces, all actions were preprogrammed as much as possible to allow
consistency of scenarios between the different AAVV commanders.
C. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS (MOES)
1. Primary MOE
The primary Measure of Effectiveness in this analysis is the number of
hostile aircraft penetrating to the battlegroup. Recalling from the
Assumptions section that each hostile aircraft carries one air-to-surface
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missile, the number of missiles launched from the hostile aircraft is an
identical measure. The measurement of the number of missiles launched is
simple but the events leading up to the missile firing must be considered. To
accomplish this analysis, secondary MOEs must be developed.
2. Secondary MOEs
The main secondary MOE is the time to detect and intercept incoming
enemy aircraft. If the carrier was destroyed or platforms within the battle
group disabled, an in-depth look at the timing of events yields a greater
understanding of decisions made by the AAWC. The time and location of
package launch is based en information obtained by inorganic information
and doctrine instilled in each AAWC. The AAWC will deploy an initial
package and the result of this deployment may be a detection. An analysis of
the reactions to information inputs is subjective, to a point. With the Orange
forces being preprogrammed and constant in their action, information inputs
will likely affect the initial location of early warning aircraft. Detection of the
incoming raid is directly attributed to the placement of search aircraft.
The location and time of hostile aircraft intercepts also aids in the
explanation of the survival or demise of the CBG. Each AAWC makes
decisions based on the information at hand. In this study information was
given at three levels of resolution: High, Medium, and Low. To analyze the
information impact, a judgment must be made on how information packets
30
affect the placement of air assets. This analysis attempts to distinguish
between individual tactics and the information content of the message traffic.
The analysis of the AA^ rC"s judgment will be paramount to evaluation of
information content and its subsequent impact on carrier battle group
defense.
The AAWC has many tactics that can be employed to defend the
carrier. These differences will be discussed in Chapter V. With the variance
in tactics there will be a difference in response time of each defensive sphere
established. An additional secondary MOE will evaluate whether timely
intercepts of unknown/hostile aircraft occurred. By evaluating initial
positioning of forces and the revealed thought processes of each commander's
tactics, the time differential between intercepts of hostile aircraft can be
compared across commanders. This time differential will be based on the
time to detection and what forces are available to intercept the platforms.
The content of information will affect the timing as well as the number of
fighter aircraft that will be airborne at the time of detection. If a majority of
fighter aircraft are launched too quickly in response to an incoming raid then
the organic refueling assets may be inadequate to keep the necessary CAPs
airborne. If, however, the fighters remain on the carrier's deck too long the}'
may not be ablr to intercept hostile aircraft prior to weapons launch. The
positioning of reconnaissance aircraft will be critical in launching additional
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aircraft in a timely fashion. Interpretation of these aspects of effectiveness




1. Notes taken during each wargame
A primary method of analysis used was information taken in the form
the author's observations during the wargame. The time, number and
ultimate location of each aircraft launched were noted. Although the
quantitative information recorded is important to any good analysis, the
primary information noted was the tactical awareness that each AAWC had
as he took action to defend the battle group. Questions were asked
periodically during each game to ascertain the reason why a particular action
was taken by the AAWC. Each time a message was given to the AAWC his
tactical awareness was probed. The comparison of what the AAWC felt was
happening with the enemy and what actually happened is discussed in Section
B of this chapter.
2. Detection log
One game-generated log that was printed at the end of each game
played was the Detection Log. If a radar, electronic, or visual track was
identified by either the Blue or Orange forces, a log was kept and stored by
the game. In the instance of all the wargame simulations, the Orange force
reactions were preprogrammed and no modifications to the Orange forces
were allowed. Therefore examination of the detection log is not pertinent to
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this analysis, since detection is directly related to timely intercepts of
unknown/hostile platforms. With the current assumptions, analysis was
accomplished more readily through the Engagement log.
3. Position Log
The Position Log gives the position of every platform at various points
in time. This log includes both Orange and Blue forces. Since Orange forces
are fixed, the placement of those platforms are known. In the case of Blue
forces, the ship movements are restricted due to the short time frame of each
game. The aircraft position log was taken by the author when appropriate,
so the Position Log was unnecessary for analysis.. Time of platform
launches as well as initial positioning was hand recorded.
4. Engagement Log
The Engagement Log was the most useful piece of game-generated
data. This log provides the time of each engagement between Blue and
Orange forces. In addition, the Engagement Log provides the platform
engaging, the weapon used, the target, and the result of each engagement.
The MOE is the number of aircraft/missiles launched which penetrated to the
CBG and is used to answer the primary question of this thesis: Did varying
information resolution affect the Anti-Air Warfare Commander's ability to
defend the carrier battle group? The total Engagement Log would be used if
the AAWC had control over the entire defensive posture of the battle group.
Shipboard defenses such as the launching of surface-to-air missiles are
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automatic within the RESA wargame. In addition the aircraft of the Orange
forces are automated for each of the three scenarios. Because of these
automated portions of the game, the number of cruise missiles launched by
the Orange forces and subsequent lock-on of any Orange missiles penetrating
the carrier aircraft defensive sphere are the data of interest from this log. A
tabulation of the number of Orange Force missiles fired and subsequently
locked-on is given in Table Five.
TABLE FIVE SCENARIO RESULTS
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a. Game Player Input
When considering the variance between players, the
discussion begins with the fact that each player has a variety of information
and experience to draw from. There were four players used for this analysis.
The background experience of each player is given in Appendix C. The ranks
of Players were from a Navy Lieutenant to a Navy Captain.
Player One had the disadvantage of being first. When this
game began only one technician was available for command inputs. Although
this arrangement was adequate for the initial setup and deployment phase,
the technician was overwhelmed by the number of commands when the
engagement phase began. As a result the intercepts of Orange forces were not
as timely as the AAWTC input commands, and several Orange force aircraft
were able to fire even though Blue force aircraft were on station and available
for intercepts. Therefore a second technician was added for subsequent runs.
There were no other discrepancies among players.
b. Definition of Player Variance
(1) Proactive player. There were two types of player
reaction: proactive or reactive. The proactive player received his message and
began to gain control of the situation aggressively. This was based on what
information was on hand and personal attributes. Usually the AACW
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established what was wanted for the defensive sphere of influence to assume
the Orange forces would to have to penetrate the defenses. As each of the
subsequent scenarios unfolded, the situation was defined with increased
tensions between Blue and Orange forces. The proactive player subsequently
began launching more aircraft initially and reinforcements were preplanned
to launch when certain criteria were met by the player. Player Two was the
prototype for this style.
(2) Reactive Player. The reactive player always tended to
initially launch a relatively small contingent of aircraft (on average two
Combat Air Patrols and two E-2 reconnaissance aircraft). Support tankers
were also launched to maintain the CAPs until a significant event occurred.
That event tended to be a confirmation of the first message or contact with
hostile aircraft inbound to the battle group. The defensive sphere was
initially established with reconnaissance and other airborne assets until a
clearer picture was established for the AAWC. Players One, Three, and Four
tended to follow this style unless initial message traffic indicated a more
aggressive stance for the Orange forces.
(3) The Players Defined. Player One tended to be a reactive
player and established a defensible position with minimal CAPS. The player
then reinforced his position once confirmation of the impending strike was
given. This method of confirmation was either by message traffic or by Blue
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force detection of Orange forces. This method did not change significantly as
more information was given to Player One. Player One became very
aggressive after confirmation of a possible attack, consistent with a reactive
player. Due to the fact that Player One had a low resolution of information
on the second and third scenarios, the missiles fired and locked on were
higher than the other players.
Player Two was very proactive from the beginning.
Complete and yet simple defensive grids were established early and only
modifications to the initial grid were used as the scenarios unfolded. The
basic core tactics remained constant. Player Two interpreted the political
climate with a great deal of finesse. The AAWC drew on his experience and
made sound and very proactive decisions. These decisions lead to one of the
better performances from the commanders. The wealth of experience of
Player Two made difficult decisions simpler and were usually made correctly.
An example of this occurred during Scenario Three when immediately after
reading the scenario background and the first message led to Player Two
launching twenty eight fighter aircraft, The positions of the CAPs were such
that no strike missiles had a chance to lock onto targets.
Player Three did not have carrier aviation experience and
thus, the first game represented more of a learning experience than for the
other players. Once armed with a understanding of fighter aircraft and their
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fuel requirements, Player Three became increasingly more proactive as the
scenarios unfolded. This can be attributed to the fact that the lowest form of
information resolution given to Player Three was medium, giving him
confidence in decisions that were made.
Player Four wanted to be extremely proactive in all
three scenarios. In several cases the referee had to restate the Rules of
Engagement to ensure that an act of war was not precipitated by the Blue
forces. Once understanding of this fact was made clear, Player Four fared
relatively well in each of the scenarios.
2. Observations
As referee, the main thing observed bt the author was how each
player regarded the information messages provided. Several of the players
waited until more information was provided even when other indications were
evident. In Player One's Scenario Three, once the last message indicated an
imminent attack, the deck launching was prompt. This is not to say that
the players were slow in their actions, however prudent behavior could be
implied in most cases for the decisions made. The need for accurate
information was great, but once the players learned that the message traffic
was accurate, the players put great trust in the message content and acted
upon its contents. The resolution of the message was also a key factor. As
expected, the High resolution messages were met with satisfaction and action
by the player involved. The Low and Medium resolution messages were met
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with some consternation about the level of resolution and were considered to
be lacking in content. When Low resolution was given to any of the four
players, the AAWC was not satisfied with the content or quality of the
message.
3. Player Comparison
In each of the scenarios two of the players shared the same
information level. An evaluation of these coinciding players will be made for
each scenario. This evaluation is to establish whether the players who
shared the same level of information resolution exhibited similar
performance. At the onset Player One had a disadvantage of having only one
technician for command input. This fact resulted in slower launches of key
aircraft. Some intercepts would have been more timely if the commands were
input quicker. This fact lead to some suppositions by the author during the
analysis of Player One's results.
a. Scenario One
Player Three and Player Four shared the same Medium
information resolution. It would be expected that the missiles fired and
locked on would be close in numeric value. In Table 5 note that the number
of missiles launched and locked on differed by only 2 in each category.
Because this was the first game played by each player, this difference is not
evaluated as significant. After the first game, unusual tactics were expected
from Orange forces, even though they were not always correctly identified.
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b. Scenario Two
Player One and Player Four shared the same Low resolution
in Scenario Two. It would be expected that the ratio of missiles fired and
missiles locked on would be higher than Scenario One for several reasons.
The first reason is that the intensity of the scenario increased by ten Orange
Force strike aircraft each time a consecutive scenario was played. A second
reason is that the information resolution level went down from Medium in
Scenario One to Low in Scenario Two. This expectation was not the case
with Player Four, probably due to the learning curve effect of having already
played Scenario One. As noted in Table Five, the number of missiles fired
was five and locked-on missiles was one. Player One had several aircraft
airborne in position, at the proper time. If the command inputs had been
entered in a timely fashion, then it is possible that the results would have
been much better in Scenario Two.
c. Scenario Three
In this scenario Player Two and Player Four shared the same
information value of High resolution. Player Two had a very low missile
count fired at Blue forces of four and no missiles locked-on. Player Four had
more missiles fired with a count of 10 and two missiles locked-on. Player
Two read the situation well and launched twenty eight fighter aircraft to
repel the attack while Player Four had only twenty fighter aircraft airborne.
Although Player Four was unable to engage all incoming aircraft, he did
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have the ability to ensaere many incoming missiles with fierhter aircraft prior
to Orange force missile lock on. However, there was not enough of those
forces launched to totally prevent Orange force missile firing and subsequent
lock -on.
d. Conclusions
TLvi number of missiles fired and locked on seem to match the
initial statement that the same resolution ends up with approximately the
same missile count for Scenario One. Both Player Three and Four had
approximately the same experience level which gives credence to this
observation. The higher experience level of Player Two was evident in
Scenario One, even though he had a low level of information.
In Scenario Two the differences appear to be the number of
technicians for command input rather than a failure to appraise the situation
properly by Player One. The understanding by Players One and Four of the
tactical situation was very close. The only variable that was not consistent
was the extra technician for Player Four. This led to faster intercepts with
available CAP aircraft. If Player One had benefited from that addition, the
scenario very likely would have produced similar results.
Scenario Three showed a difference in missiles fired and a
slight difference in missiles that locked on. This is probably attributed to the
experience level of Player Two. Player Two had a great deal of political and
military insight. It is believed that both players knew the threat axis and
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responded properly. A lack of experience of Player Four in relation to Player
Two led to a difference in response level. Player Two responded with forty
percent more aircraft than Player Four.
4. Information Level Variance
This section deals with the differences noted between information
resolution for each scenario. Table Six outlines the total missile shots for
each scenario based on the information resolution used. In all cases if two
identical levels of resolution were used then their results were averaged. The
expected results would be that the numbers of Orange missiles fired and
subsequently locked on would decrease as information resolution increased.
Scenario One produced the reverse situation. This situation can be
attributed to the fact that each player had an adjustment phase to the set of
scenarios faced. Each player had many questions about the game which
resulted in slower reactions to events in Scenario One.
In Scenarios Two and Three the number of locked-on missiles were
reduced by increasing information. A trend was noted by observing the
placement of forces. At Low resolution the reaction of all players was
surprise at finding at least one Orange flight of bombers in a location not
expected. Blue forces were usually out of position for a intercept prior to
Orange Forces being able to launch their missiles. As the resolution
increased in value, the AAWCs were able to predict the location of enemy
flights prior to organic sources gaining contact. This allowed for more timely
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intercepts which resulted in fewer missile launches and, more importantly,
fewer missiles that locked on. By decreasing missile lock on, there is an
obvious decrease in vulnerability of the carrier battle group.
TABLE SIX INFORMATION RESOLUTION RESULTS
SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO
ONE TWO THREE
LOW Missiles Fired - 7 Missiles Fired - 8 Missiles Fired - 13
RESOLUTION Locked On - Locked On - 4 Locked On - 8
MEDIUM Missiles Fired - 10 Missiles Fired - 7 Missiles Fired - 2
RESOLUTION Locked On - 3 Locked On -
1
Locked On -
HIGH Missiles Fired - 11 Missiles Fired - 4 Missiles Fired - 5
RESOLUTION Locked On - 6 Locked On - Locked On - 1
* Averaged number from the two coinciding levels of resolution
5. Scenario Level Variance
Table Six offers another representation of the information collected.
By averaging the number of missiles fired and locked-on for each scenario it
would be expected that since each subsequent scenario contained a more
intense airborne strike, the missile counts in both categories would increase.
Table Seven provides an averaged calculation of the results from each
scenario. The results do not indicate that increasing intensity caused
increased missile firing and subsequent lock-ons. The results do indicate
that Scenario One had high numbers in both recorded categories which, as
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previously indicated, was probably due to its being the first one played by
each player. In Scenarios Two and Three the average number of missile
firings and lock-ons were reduced by the increased information resolution.
This indicates that scenario difficulty does not necessarily mean increased
losses by the defending forces.
TABLE 7 AVERAGED RESULTS
SCENARIO ONE SCENARIO TWO SCENARIO THREE
Missiles Fired 9.5 6.75 6.25
Missile Lock-on 3 2.25 2.5
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Questions
The questions first asked in this thesis were:
1. Can a wargame simulation provide the mechanism for an accurate
evaluation of communications input to a earner battle group?
2. Can a wargame provide a generic method for acquisition planners to
simulate the value of communications information in an anti-air
warfare environment?
3. Will a statistical analysis of an Event Driven simulation provide a basis
for the use of wargames to test proposed communications upgrades ?
In the following sections, answers to these questions will be postulated.
Several ideas for the future and suggestions for updates to the current version
of the RESA wargame will also be discussed.
2. Proposed Upgrades To The RESA Wargame
The game visually displays a realistic waroom appearance. When
dealing with the display, the game should be capable of displaying known
aircraft types and current weapons loadout, in addition to the current course,
speed, and altitude which the game currently displays. This would
significantly reduce the frequent and common questions asked by the AAWC.
An update to the data base presentation is a major need..
Full unclassified platform capabilities need to be incorporated. Two
examples will illustrate the requirement. The first is the F/A-18 fighter
attack aircraft. In the RESA database this aircraft had the capability of not
only carrying fuel droptanks on all wing stations to increase its poor combat
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radius, but on the same aircraft a full complement of weapons could also be
loaded. Also altitude had no effect on gas consumption and the maximum
conserve airspeed was twenty five knots, well below minimum speed
necessary for flight.
The second example is the EA-6B electronics aircraft. This aircraft
was not capable of carrying the HARM anti-radiation missile and could not do
both jamming and ESM collection at the same time. These are two of the
obvious discrepancies that need to be addressed in future updates.
3. Communications Evaluation
In all of the analysis presented in this thesis, a certain amount of
subjectivity was necessary to incorporate the human factor. The numbers do
indicate that increasing the amount and quality of information does lead to a
reduced missile launch count by Orange forces. By spanning four ranks
within the subject players there was a level of experience that had to be
considered. If the same general experience level had been used, an increased
correlation of results would likely have been realized. By simulating
communications nodes that more accurately represented all inputs to the
carrier battle group, more detailed analysis could have been performed.
4. Acquisition Planning
If actual systems (message traffic, communications, and imagery)
can be specified, then proposed communications upgrades could be simulated
on a concept level and the value of these upgrades examined prior to
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expenditure of research and development money. By establishing the basis
for information evaluation inputs, these inputs could be translated into
existing or proposed upgrades.
5. Statistical Analysis
In this thesis the analysis focused on the revealed thought process of
a commander who was given information and was told to act on that
information. Whenever the human factor is considered, a certain amount of
subjectivity is introduced. If analysis is done on the correct Measures of
Effectiveness, then the process described in this thesis can be effectively used
to test current systems and proposed upgrades.
6. Recommendations For Further Study
This thesis indicates that a wargame simulation is a mechanism for
evaluation of communication input to a CBG. Further study and
development is necessary before the fleet receives results that are applicable.
There are two areas that warrant further study. The first area is the use of
the RESA simulation to be used as a trainer for the Space and Electronic
Warfare Commander (SEWC) watch team. The flow of information through
the watch team could be simulated with the scripting ability of the RESA
simulator. This simulator could be shared by both fleets simultaneously due
to the fact that RESA can share and operate from two different locations. By
establishing a wargame simulation for the SEWTC team, new doctrine and
tactics can be established. Further areas of communications could be tried
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prior to fleet installation. This would reduce the need to waste time and
refits on systems that prove to be undesirable or poor fleet performers.
a. Stage One
The first step would be to establish what communications
inputs are available for the SEWC watchteam. This project would entail an
entire thesis. All possible communications that would be useful to the SEWC
should be prioritized through the Director Space and Electronic Warfare
Commander (N-6). Only by including this office for Navy consensus would
the next stage have any meaning for the fleet.
b. Stage Two
The next stage would to script the major communications
nodes into a script form for the RESA wargame. In order to accomplish this a
student would need to observe a SEWC watch team in action to find out a
suitable station layout and human communications that would be necessary.
Although each watch team currently trains with a lack of established doctrine
it would provide a framework to begin the study. Once this has been
accomplished and the wargame tested by student for flaws, an actual watch
team could be used for training. An essential link for the Naval Postgraduate
School would be the Space and Electronic W7arfare Commander. By working
with both Atlantic and Pacific Fleet Training and fleet SEW commanders; a
fleet supported method would be established. As this portion of the game
progresses then additional links would be folded into the system. The entire
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game may need to be elevated to higher classification level to incorporate all
known sources.
c. Stage Three
The final step this thesis will propose would be to build an
entire wargame modeled after the Tactical Flag Command Center. By using
a wargame to train and explore new ideas and tactics, this game can help
train the fleet with less actual exercise money. Although actual training can
never be replaced by wargaming, more free thinking can be used when actual
forces are not in danger and the full operational research field can be used to
fine tune untried tactics before it necessary to engage the enemy. With the
current low intensity conflict currently in vogue, there are hundreds of
scenarios never imagined or tried. The wargame provides the only way we
can face these new challenges without the costly mistakes that result in the









SUBJ Intelligence report on increasing activity Scenario 1.
1) As of 0400 local time a noticeable increase in maintenance and ground
communications from Cha-bahar, Jask, Bandar-Abas were observed. These
communications are more intense than noted throughout the week during
normal flight operations.





SUBJ Intelligence report on aircraft launched Scenario 1.
1) Through reliable sources, it was noted that an unusual by large number of
aircraft had launched from Cha-Bahar, Jask, and Bandar-Abas. These
aircraft could not be identified due to poor visibility. Time of incident just prior
to sunrise local time.
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SUBJ Intelligence report on aircraft launched Scenario 1.
1) It was noted that 3 flights of 5 bomber aircraft were launched from
Cha-Bahar, Jask, and Bandar-Abas. They were loaded with air-to-surface
missiles. The launches occurred during the early morning hours. The source
was known to be accurate.





SUBJ Intelligence report on aircraft launched - Scenario 1.
1) It has been confirmed that aircraft from the three bases of the previous
message were launched at daybreak. The composition and course of these
aircraft could not be determined; however, there were too many aircraft
launched for just a reconnaissance patrol.





SUBJ Intelligence report on aircraft launched - Scenario 1.
1) Through further intelligence the aircraft launched were identified as
bomber aircraft. The type and load out of these aircraft could not be
ascertained. Initial course was in a southerly direction. It is assumed that
these aircraft were launched due to your presence.
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SUBJ Intelligence report on aircraft launched - Scenario 1.
1) The aircraft launched from the three bases were identified as Backfire
bombers. These bombers were reported over Omanian and Iranian airspace.
These overflights indicate hostile intent and should be defended as such.





SUBJ Intelligence report on increasing activity - Scenario 2.
1) After securing Ping Tung, Taiwan and Batan island regular air patrols
have resumed. It has been noted that increasing ground activity was occurring
around daybreak. A change of increasing presence in the South China Sea
can be expected from the Chinese mainland.





SUBJ Intelligence report on aircraft launched - Scenario 2.
1) Under the cover of darkness several unusual flights took off at daybreak
from Hong Kong, Ping Tung, Taiwan and Batan island. Although
identification was not possible there was too many launches for a regular
patrol cycle.
53





SUBJ Intelligence report on aircraft launched - Scenario 2.
1) Several fights of backfire bombers were launched in the early morning
hours. At least 10 aircraft were launched from two of the three bases listed:
Hong Kong, Pinot, and Batan island. The general course was south for all
flights.





SUBJ Intelligence report on aircraft launched - Scenario 2.
1) Confirmation of increased activity in the South China Sea has occurred.
Aircraft have been launched consisting of reconnaissance and bomber aircraft.
These launches could be a result of your presence in the area.





SUBJ Intelligence report on aircraft launched - Scenario 2.
1) Confirmation of aircraft launch has occurred. Identification of aircraft is
limited to the flights being bomber aircraft. The course of these aircraft was
south. The launches can be assumed to be related to your presence.
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SUBJ Intelligence report on aircraft launched - Scenario 2.
1) Confirmation of the aircraft launches has occurred. High speed bomber
aircraft were noted over the Philippine Islands and Vietnam, the southern
half. These overflights can be regarded as hostile intent if flight change
course towards you. Assume that these aircraft are conducting a surgical
strike against you.





SUBJ Intelligence report on increasing activity - Scenario 3.
1) The New Soviets have retaken the Kuril Islands. This action occurred
after the resettlement by Japanese citizens. The New Soviets have increased
their defense posture and reconnaissance flights. Extremely high volumes of
ground and maintenance radio traffic were noted seven hours ago at
Petropovlosk and in the early morning hours today at Petropovlosk, Korsa,
and Okha.
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SUBJ Intelligence report on aircraft launched - Scenario 3.
1) Seven hours ago several aircraft were launched from Petropovlosk. In the
early morning hours an unusual amount of aircraft were launched from
Petropovlosk, Korsa, and Okha. Although visibility was not clear enough for
identification it can be assumed that some strike aircraft were involved.





SUBJ Intelligence report on aircraft launched - Scenario 3.
1) Seven hours ago reconnaissance and strike aircraft were deployed.
Although composition of all aircraft was not ascertained the flights'
whereabouts are unknown.
2) Petropavlovsk, Korsakov, and Okha all reported launches of bomber
aircraft. These aircraft were launched at daybreak local time and their course
was approximately East/Southeast.





SUBJ Intelligence report on aircraft launched • Scenario 3.
1) Confirmation of aircraft launch were noted seven hours ago. At daybreak
several flights of aircraft were launched from the three bases noted in the first
message. General course of these aircraft flights was east/south east.
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SUBJ Intelligence report on aircraft launched - Scenario 3.
1) Confirmation of aircraft launch seven hours ago and at daybreak are
confirmed. Most, if not all, aircraft were bombers. The first flight of aircraft
could not remain airborne without refueling prior to this time. General course
of all aircraft initially was east/south east.





SUBJ Intelligence report on aircraft launched - Scenario 3.
1) Confirmation of strike aircraft launched seven hours ago. Tanker aircraft
were also noted as part of the package launch.
2) At least four flights of bomber aircraft were launched from the three bases
previously noted in my prior message. These aircraft are assumed to be a
punitive strike against the United States for intervention in the Kuril Islands.
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APPENDIX B PLAYER BRIEFINGS
A. SCENARIO ONE
Due to the downsizing of Iraqi forces as a result of Operation Desert
Storm, Iran has emerged from the conflict as the regional power in Southwest
Asia. A massive arms procurement program has made Iran's defenses
formidable. In a recent clash with Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC) on oil pricing, Iran has declared the Straits of Hormuz as
being the territorial waters of Iran. This declaration includes all air space
over the straits.
The mission of the Abraham Lincoln Carrier Battle Group is to insert the
battle group through the Straits of Hormuz into the Persian Gulf and
reestablish the international waterway and airway as quickly as possible.
Iran has threatened to sink any ship coming in or out of the Persian Gulf.
Recent aircraft patrols indicate that Iran plans to stand behind their
blockade. The battle group is to expect heavy airborne resistance. Additional
intelligence surmises that Iranian overflights of local neighbors may be
possible due to the corrosive stance of Iran. The area map attached will give
you a feel for location and bases involved.
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B. SCENARIO TWO
During a recent reunification summit between China and Taiwan an
argument over local forms of government has resulted in an international
incident. China has decided to retake Taiwan by force. China now occupies
southern Taiwan with an operational air base. In addition, China has used
this opportunity to take Batan Inland. China has anticipated the world's
condemnation and has threatened any ship of war or aircraft operating in the
South China Sea. The Lincoln battle group is to steam into the South China
Sea and establish the first international presence. China's reaction to this
provocation can not be estimated at this time. If engaged, the commander of
the Lincoln's battle group is to engage and defend the group with vigor. The
key word is to defend. Under no circumstances is the battlegroup to engage in
land strike warfare without permission from higher authority. The area map
attached will give you a feel for location and bases involved.
C. SCENARIO THREE
After the fall of the Soviet Union a group called the New Soviets has
taken over in western Russia. In taking power the New Soviets have nullified
a recent agreement to return the Kuril Islands to Japan. The Japanese have
repopulated the islands only to find New Soviet troops invading their newly
acquired territory. After some resistance civilian casualties were heavy. The
New Soviets classify the Kuril Islands as theirs and are prepared to back their
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claim. The Lincoln battle group is to test the resolve of the New Soviets and
sail into the area. Although more of the fleet is steaming to the area, the
Lincoln battle group will be the first on scene. Airborne attacks are likely,
however, a reminder is that the battlegroup will defend itself only if attacked.
This is to give the National Command Authority time to make a decision
whether to engage in a regional conflict.
D. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
Patrols of Anti-Surface Warfare (ASUW) aircraft can be expected in all
scenarios. Any overt runs of these aircraft at the CBG will be warned by
radio communications. This is limited to offensive platforms. If no response
is given by offensive aircraft the flight may be engaged. Any hostile aircraft
within weapons range will be engaged. Any surveillance aircraft may be
engaged if the platform penetrates within 150 nm of the CBG. If possible,
any known hostile aircraft will be engaged prior to hostile reaching maximum
weapons range. Engagement range will be determined by the Battle Group
Commander's assessment and resources available.
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APPENDIX C THE PLAYERS
1. Player One
Commander Randy Wight
Instructor for the Space Systems Academic Group
EA6-B Prowler ECMO, EW Planning Officer for the Libyan Air Strike
2. Player Two
Captain Gordon Nagagawa (Ret.)
Adjunct Professor Operational Analysis
A6 Intruder Bombardier Navigator. 185+ combat missions Viet Nam,
POW.
3. Player Three
Lieutenant Commander Larry Whitmeyer
Student NPGS, Space Operations Curriculum
P3 TACCO, Mission Commander, 14 years experience.
4. Player Four
Lieutenant Gary Schram
Student NPGS, Space Operations Curriculum
S3-B TACCO, Mission Commander, 9 years experience
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